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Chile is home to 10% of the world’s volcanoes and, according to many scientists and 
energy experts, is a prime location for geothermal energy development. Yet, to date, Chile has no 
geothermal plant in production. Despite extremely high energy prices and energy shortages in the 
country, very little has been done to exploit one of Chile’s most promising energy resources. 
Through a series of over 30 interviews with government officials, geothermal industry experts, 
community leaders, and university professors, I will clarify the advantages of geothermal energy 
in Chile, as well as the barriers to development and the potential policy solutions to diminish 
those barriers. The most critical barriers identified in this study are: (1) high cost and risk of 
initial investments, (2) lack direction on energy development and institutional support on the part 
of the government, and (3) vague elements of the legal and regulatory framework. 
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1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Chile has one of faster growing economies in the world. The Central Bank of Chile has noted 
GDP growth of 6.3% in 2011, 5.5% in 2012 and anticipated growth of 4.5 to 5.0% in 2013.1  As 
a result of this growth, Chile had the highest GDP (PPP) per capita in 2011 in Latin America at 
USD $17,310 – well ahead of other Latin American economic centers like Brazil and Mexico.2 
Despite this economic success, Chile will likely be able to continue to realize such growth only if 
it is able to overcome a significant hurdle: serious energy supply constraints. High energy costs 
and slow energy project development in response to tight supply and increasing demand have 
recently forced Chilean citizens and industries to pay some of the highest energy prices in the 
Latin America. In fact, Chile had energy prices that exceeded averages among other OECD 
member nations by 61% in early 2013.3  Evidence collected by various international and 
governmental agencies suggests that Chile will face serious (and perhaps debilitating) energy 
shortages and price increases by 2020 unless the nation finds ways to stabilize and secure its 
energy supply.4 While the current situation may seem bleak, Chile has not exploited all of its 
domestic sources of energy  - including those, like geothermal, that have proven cost competitive 
in some other markets. Development of these domestic sources could alleviate some of supply 
                                                 
1 “2012 Quarterly Economic Indicators.” Central Bank of Chile. Web. 2012. 
2 GDP, PPP (Current International $), World Bank. 2013. Web.  
3 Woods, Randall. 2013. “Chile Seeks Developed Status, Meets Soaring Energy Costs”. Bloomberg.com. 15 Jan 
2013. 
4 “An Unexpected Setback.” The Economist. 1 Jun 2012. Web. 17 Apr 2013. 
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constraints. Through a series of interviews and interactions with key actors in the Chilean 
geothermal sector, I will clarify how key actors in the energy sector perceive the advantages of 
geothermal energy in Chile, as well as barriers to development and potential policy solutions to 
diminish those barriers. I will also compare how these perceptions may be similar or different 
across actors in an attempt to shed light on how feasible policy solutions for certain barriers may 
be. Some of the most critical barriers to geothermal development identified in this study are: (1) 
high cost and risk for investors, (2) lack of government direction and institutional support on the 
part of the government, and (3) vague elements of the legal and regulatory framework. 
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2.0  BACKGROUND 
 
Because Chile has very few indigenous sources of energy, the country must rely on imported 
fossil fuels for energy production. The energy sector faced serious stress in 2007 and 2008 when 
Chile’s main supplier of natural gas, Argentina, experienced a colder than normal winter. 
Needing a greater supply of natural gas to heat the homes of its own citizens, Argentina severely 
reduced supply to Chile.  Diesel oil, although quite expensive, was the only available alternative 
to meet the unexpected shortages in supply in natural gas. Diesel oil was readily available and 
could be substituted for natural gas in thermoelectric plants that no longer had a supply arriving 
from Argentina. In the same period as the natural gas shortage, drought in Chile decreased 
energy output from many of the domestic hydroelectric facilities – which supplied roughly half 
of the energy supply at the time.5 In its most recent annual report, the board chairman of Chilean 
energy company Colbún S.A., noted “the Chilean power sector…has faced a complex situation 
which has prevented it from regaining balance between supply and demand.” As a result, energy 
shortages and high, volatile energy prices have been present since 2007 in Chile’s two major grid 
systems, the Central Interconnected System (SIC) and the Norte Grande Interconnected System 
(SING).  
 
                                                 
5 Government of Chile. National Energy Strategy 2012-2030. Government of Chile, 2012. PDF File. 
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Source: Government of Chile, Ministry of Energy, CDEC-SIC and CDEC-SING 
 
Further compounding Chile’s energy problem is the lack of new energy projects under 
construction. Several new power generation projects that were meant to meet incremental growth 
in demand have faced major delays and/or have been completely stopped due to public 
opposition or judicial intervention. In fact, it is projected that only 30% of the 11,000 MW of 
additional installed capacity planned by the National Energy Commission (CNE) in 2006 will be 
available by the commission’s original deadline of 2015. 6 In 2014, Chile reaches a critical 
juncture in capacity vs. demand. Without more planned projects reaching the point of 
development, the energy problem may soon become and energy crisis. 
This lack of new projects under construction in the pipeline means that Chile will likely 
have to depend on very expensive diesel imports in the near term to fuel existing facilities. 
Colbún’s 2011 Annual Report warns that generation companies will likely need to rely ‘high-
                                                 
6 Colbún  S.A. Annual Report 2011. Colbún S.A., 2011. PDF File. 
Figure 1. Change in Marginal Energy Costs 
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cost diesel oil’ for a ‘greater than reasonable fraction of power generation’.7  According to 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), diesel energy remains one of the most expensive 
options in Chile’s energy mix.  
 
Figure 2. Demand vs. Capacity in Electricity Generation, SIC and SING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDF Suez 
 
High and overly variable energy prices could severely hinder the country’s export 
economy by increasing the cost of goods produced, particularly in Chile’s very large mining 
sector. Some private companies – particularly those in the mining sector – have been forced to 
stray from their core businesses to develop in their own energy projects to ensure supply.8  High 
energy prices are beginning to introduce a feeling of uncertainty among Chilean businesses and 
citizens. Rising energy costs are particularly worrisome due to the impact of currency 
                                                 
7 Colbún  S.A. Annual Report 2011. Colbún S.A., 2011. PDF File. 
8 Urenda, Juan Carlos.  “The Chilean Mining Sector.” Office of the Mining Commission. Santiago, Chile. 11 Mar. 
2013. Invited Speaker. 
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appreciation on the competitiveness of exports, which accounted for 35% of Chile’s GDP in 
2010.9 Over time, Chile may become increasingly less competitive on the world market if the 
government cannot partner with the energy sector to correct escalating prices and supply 
bottlenecks. The situation has lead former president Ricardo Lagos to comment, “Now, our 
energy policy isn’t very clear, which makes it difficult for some to make investments with 
Chile.” 
A crucial industry to consider is the mining industry. Chile is the world’s largest producer 
of copper. In 2012, mining and mining-related services accounted for 40% of Chile’s GDP and 
35% of all energy usage in Chile.10 In the near term, Chile’s continued growth and development 
hinge on the stability and growth of the mining sector. In Chile, energy accounts for roughly 
15% of costs in mining. Chile has the second highest energy prices of any major copper-
producing nation in the world. Only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo does it cost more 
to power a copper mining operation.11 Fortunately for Chilean mining companies, global copper 
prices have been very high in recent years (See Table 1), helping to insulate these firms from 
some of the burden of high energy costs in the years after energy prices spiked in 2007. 
However, the Chilean copper industry could very easily face lean years if copper prices take a 
different trajectory, as current costs for producing one pound of copper in Chile ($1.60/lb) are 
nearly the identical to the price per pound of copper on the world market in 2005 ($1.67/lb).  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Bradley, Ruth. “Chile: Start with Challenges” Latin Trade July/August 2011, 54-58. 
10 Martinez, Pablo. “GDF Suez in Chile.” Austral Offices. Santiago, Chile. 11 Mar. 2013. Invited Speaker. 
11 Urenda, Juan Carlos.  “The Chilean Mining Sector.” Office of the Mining Commission. Santiago, Chile. 11 Mar. 
2013. Invited Speaker. 
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Table 1: Copper Prices, Copper Exports, and Total Exports in Chile, 2003-2011 
 
Source: Central Bank of Chile 
 
So, what can be done to improve energy security? The large-scale coal and hydroelectric 
projects proposed in recent years will likely not be the solution. These projects have proven very 
unpopular and , in some cases make the country’s energy matrix even less sustainable. The 
answer to Chile’s energy woes will likely be found in (1) increased usage of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), (2) more strategic development of hydroelectric projects, and (3) a significant increase in 
investment in non-conventional renewable energy (NCRE).  See Figure 3 Appendix for complete 
analysis of energy resource alternatives in Chile.  
While a variety of NCRE resources may be considered for matrix expansion in the future, 
geothermal energy represents a particularly attractive choice (Again, see Appendix Figure 3 for 
review of energy options in Chile). Unlike hydropower, Geothermal would not be impacted by 
drought. Unlike fossil fuels, it would not be subject to fluctuations in international supply and 
prices. And, perhaps most importantly, unlike most other renewables, it can produce energy 24 
hours per day, 7 days per week. The fact that geothermal energy can produce around the clock 
means that it is a base load energy resource. In other words, it is a perfect substitute for base load 
fossil fuels in energy generation. Therefore, it can be used to power large-scale industrial 
operations – like mining – that operate continuously. Geothermal represents a significant 
opportunity to meet some of the needed incremental growth in capacity and, at the same time, 
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achieve a greater amount of secure, domestic energy supply. Many countries, like Iceland,12 the 
Philippines,13 and New Zealand14 have faced similar energy constraints and have turned to their 
geothermal resources to buttress a variable and unstable energy supply. For the remainder of this 
essay, I will consider opportunities related to geothermal energy, one of the most abundant and 
promising undeveloped NCRE energy resources in Chile. 
 
                                                 
12 Mims, Christopher. “One Hot Island: Iceland’s Renewable Geothermal Power.” Scientific American. 20 Oct 2008. 
13 “Philippines Tap Energy from Earth’s Core”. Online Video Clip. CNNMoney. CNNMoney, 25 Feb 2013. Web. 14 
Apr 2013. 
14International Energy Agency. New Zealand 2010 Review. International Energy Agency, 2010. 65. PDF File. 
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3.0  THE STATUS OF NCRE IN CHILE AND THE CASE OF GEOTHERMAL  
 
In April of 2008, the government of Chile passed the Law for the Development of Non-
Conventional Renewable Energy (NCRE). This law requires electric companies to demonstrate 
that a specific percentage of energy produced is generated from NCRE sources.  As of 2010, the 
law required that 5% of energy was generated from NCRE sources. This required 5% will 
incrementally climb to 10% by 2024.15 In 2012, the government released an updated national 
energy strategy. In this report, the Piñera administration dubbed the 10% level ‘inadequate’ 
because only 3% of energy was being produced from renewables at the time of the February 
2012 publication. The strategy noted, “Our objective for the future composition of the matrix is 
to accelerate the incorporation of NCRE sources…” The report called for 20% of all energy to be 
derived from NCRE sources by 2020 as part of an effort to make the matrix “ever-cleaner, more 
diverse and safer”. However, after over a year of debate, this strategy for NCRE has yet to 
become law.  
Despite the slow but somewhat promising growth of NCRE in Chile, there are still vast 
amounts of renewable resources not being utilized or developed. Geothermal energy is a prime 
example of an underdeveloped source. Of the 743.12 MW of non-conventional renewable energy 
                                                 
15 International Energy Agency. Chile Energy Policy Review. International Energy Agency, 2009. 167. PDF File. 
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in production in Chile as of June 2012, there was not a single mega-watt being produced from a 
geothermal plant.16 See Figure 3 below for 2011 NCRE development data. 
Figure 3: Status of Renewable Energy Development in Chile, 2011 
 
Source: Center for Renewable Energy, Chilean Government 
 
The Ministry of Energy speculates that two geothermal plants will likely come online by 
2015, each with a capacity of less than 100MW.17 However, recent comment by the general 
manager for one of these projects indicated a timeline the completion of his project will likely 
occur after 2015.18 Regardless, these two plants represent only a small fraction of the amount of 
geothermal power that could be produced in Chile. The International Energy Agency notes that 
the country exhibits much potential for generating geothermal energy, as Chile is home to 10% 
                                                 
16 Centro de Energías Renovables. “Proyectos ERNC en Operación”. Centro de Energías Renovables. June 2012. 
Web. 22 Aug 2012. 
17 Espinosa, Carolina. Personal Interview. 26 July 2012. 
18 Trenkle, Rüdiger. “Central Geotérmica Curacautín” Offices of the Center for Geothermal Excellence of the Andes 
at La Universidad de Chile. Santiago, Chile. 4 Apr. 2013. Guest Speaker. 
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of the world’s volcanoes. The National Petroleum Company of Chile, ENAP, estimates that the 
country has the potential to produce 3,350MW of geothermal energy19, a significant percentage 
of the nearly 8,000MW of additional capacity the government predicts will be needed by 2020.20 
Figure 4: Chile LCOE Analysis, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
 
Geothermal energy is not only abundant, but also cost competitive. The In 2011, the 
International Energy Agency reported, “New plant generation in some countries can be highly 
competitive…at USD 50/MWh and 80/MWh”. With its wealth of resources, Chile can likely 
produce at similar costs. A 2011 Bloomberg New Energy Finance analysis of levelized cost of 
energy (LCOE) in the Chilean market finds geothermal to be one most cost competitive NCRE 
sources and one of the more cost competitive resources of any type. Only onshore wind, 
                                                 
19 International Energy Agency. Chile Energy Policy Review. International Energy Agency, 2009. 163. PDF File. 
20 Government of Chile. National Energy Strategy 2012-2030. Government of Chile, 2012. PDF File. 
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biomass, biogas, and certain types of hydroelectric resources supersede geothermal LCOE. See 
Figure 4 for LCOE analysis. 
Obviously, some energy development companies recognize the potential for a larger, 
stronger geothermal sector in Chile and have established operations in the market (See Appendix 
Table 4 for review of active geothermal development companies in Chile). In fact, a tender for 
20 geothermal concessions (a government permit for exploration in a given area) in April of 
2012 brought nearly USD $250 million of promised investment from both domestic and 
international companies.21 As of July 2012, 76 concessions have been granted for geothermal 
exploration and 6 concessions granted for exploitation. An additional 83 concessions for 
exploration have been requested, but have yet to be approved by the government (See Appendix 
for list of geothermal concessions by company in Chile as of July 2012).22 Despite all of this 
activity, the fact remains that development of the geothermal sector in Chile lags far behind its 
potential. Interest in geothermal energy among some of the biggest, most influential companies 
in the Chilean energy generation market remains relatively tepid (See Appendix Figure 5 for 
review of Chile’s largest energy generation companies). A 2010 initiative that included 
Colbún23, one of Chile’s major electricity generators, has not moved forward. Despite all of this 
activity, however, Chile remains without any geothermal energy in production and only very 
modest plans for future development. 
This abundance of opportunity in geothermal energy would seem to be a boon for a 
country so starved for energy. So, despite the upside of geothermal energy, why has the 
                                                 
21 Geothermal Energy Association. Geothermal: International Market Overview Report. Geothermal Energy 
Association, 2012. PDF File. 
22 Ministry of Energy, Government of Chile. Geothermal Concession Database. Ministry of Energy, Government of 
Chile, 2012. PDF File.  
23 “Colbun mulls over 300MW Renewable Energy Projects”. SeeNews Renewables. 25 Jun 2010. 
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development process for geothermal been so slow and laborious? In his book “Collapse”, Jared 
Diamond lists several reasons why countries may not decide to capitalize on opportunities that 
could prevent resource scarcity, ease economic hardships, and ensure self-preservation. In other 
words, Diamond attempts to answer why countries might make choices that seem to directly 
(and, at times, obviously) lead to suboptimal social and/or economic results. First, he speculates 
that some societies “may do disastrous things because they failed to anticipate a problem before 
it arrived, for any of several reasons. One is that they may have no prior experience of such 
problems, and so may not have been sensitized to the possibility” or, perhaps, “the experience [of 
dealing with the problem before] happened so long ago as to have been forgotten”.  Considering 
Chile has faced high energy prices and shortages for nearly five years, both the government and 
the citizens are well aware of the energy problem at hand. Yet, significant policy action has not 
been taken. Second, Diamond suggests, a society may fail to anticipate a problem due to 
“reasoning by false analogy”. He continues, “When we are in a unfamiliar situation, we fall back 
on drawing analogies with old familiar situations”. Again, I doubt this is the case in Chile. Key 
actors and government leaders have a wealth of international information available from 
countries that have faced similar types of energy issues. As mentioned before, many energy-
scare countries with similar levels of geothermal capacity have pursued development of the 
resource through a variety of public and private means. Energy scarcity is certainly not 
unprecedented in modern times. Third, Diamond argues that perhaps societies “fail to perceive” 
a problem even when it clearly exists.  This may arise because the origins of the problem are 
simply “imperceptible” and/or the problem arises in the form of a “slow trend” which is 
“concealed by wide up-and-down fluctuations.”  Considering the dramatic onset of the increases 
in energy prices coupled with a large amount of public outcry over the issue, it is again unlikely 
14 
that this is the cause. Finally, Diamond posits, that it is perhaps ‘rational behavior’ that leads to 
actions that seem so irrational. That is, Diamond writes, “some people may reason correctly that 
they can advance their own interests by behavior harmful to other people.”  While this fourth 
element in Diamond’s framework might be part of the issue in Chile – considering the large 
existing investments in fossil fuel facilities by Chile’s largest energy generators – it isn’t likely to 
be the entire reason.  
I believe that the nature of Chile’s problem could probably be a very valuable fifth pillar 
of Diamond’s framework. In Chile, nearly everyone perceives a problem with energy, but not 
everyone seems to perceive the nature of the problem (or the solutions to that problem) to be the 
same. Thus, many groups are attempting to solve similar problems in different and, at times, 
competing ways. Proposed solutions from the government have been many and varied – with 
little effort placed behind turning these proposals into legitimate policies. The largest actors in 
the energy generation industry seem to want to continue on the path of business as usual, 
investing most of their money in the very technologies that have been the root of the existing 
energy problems. A majority of the public staunchly supports renewable energy to the point that 
certain civil organizations have been quite successful in stalling construction of many non-NCRE 
plants. Finally, the academic community seems to often focus on the technical aspects of energy 
over the somewhat more pressing political aspects of energy. Thus, the direction Chile will take 
to achieve greater energy security is cloudy, at best. 
In an attempt to better understand how geothermal energy might be developed in such an 
unclear environment, I felt it was prudent to interview key actors from a variety of backgrounds. 
I was able to gather many perspectives clearly show where individuals stood on the issue. In 
15 
doing so, the aggregate of these perspectives may shed light on where opportunities and 
challenges might exist for future development of Chile’s geothermal resources. 
16 
4.0  THE STUDY 
In an effort to understand why geothermal development lags behind other resources in Chile, 
interviews were conducted with more than 30 key actors in the Chilean geothermal sector. Each 
of these actors works within government, business, academia, and/or civil society. Through these 
interviews, I have found that many obstacles are present in the Chilean market and nearly all are 
insufficiently addressed by current policy. Through this series of interviews conducted in July 
and August of 2012, I have identified and measured many key actors’ perceptions about the: 
1. Advantages of geothermal energy in the Chilean context. 
2. Barriers to the development of geothermal energy in Chile. 
3. Potential policy proposals to overcome those barriers to geothermal development in the 
Chile. 
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5.0  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to understand why geothermal power has not been incorporated into 
Chile’s electricity supply, despite the slow development of other NCRE resources. I focus on 
geothermal power production via exploitation of high enthalpy resources, as low enthalpy 
resources are not conducive to generating electricity. I aim to advance and expand the 
conversation about the role of geothermal resources in Chile’s matrix. By more clearly 
identifying these advantages, barriers, and incentives I can develop policy suggestions that may 
help to spur development in the sector. At the same time, I can provide a platform from which an 
expanded discourse about the role of geothermal energy in Chile can grow between actors in 
industry, government, civil society and academia. 
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6.0  METHODOLOGY 
This study does not attempt to engage in a case comparison between other countries that have 
developed geothermal energy. I rely mainly on the market study because the Chilean energy 
market and social context is decidedly unique to other countries that have developed geothermal 
energy in a significant way.  In 1982, Chile was the first country in Latin America to extensively 
privatize its energy sector. Today, energy generation, transmission, and distribution are still 
owned and managed by the private sector, with very modest amounts of regulation by 
government institutions.  As such, the government does not engage in significant projects to spur 
development and dissemination of new technologies – like those used to generate geothermal 
energy.  In every other case of geothermal development, governments have played a crucial role 
in developing the resource – often with state-owned drilling companies. Considering the role of 
the state in Chile will likely be secondary to actors in the private sector, the case of geothermal 
energy in Chile will need to be considered and evaluated, in most circumstances, on a stand-
alone basis. This is not to say that experiences in other countries are not valuable references in 
our discussion of geothermal energy in Chile, but it does suffice to say that a case comparison  
would likely produce results that would consistently point to extremely heavy state involvement 
lacking in Chile. To avoid such obvious conclusions, I instead opt to explore geothermal energy 
in Chile as a unique case and rely on commonalities and differences in the perspectives of key 
actors within the Chilean market to guide my final recommendations. 
19 
I created a standardized 58-question survey and interviewed over 30 key stakeholders 
about the perceived advantages and barriers of geothermal development in Chile. The barriers 
included in the study were derived, in part, from those identified in a 2012 Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance report (See Appendix Table 6). 24  Additionally, I asked these stakeholders about 
a series of incentives used by other nations to diminish the barriers to geothermal development. I 
grouped these individuals into three categories: Government, Industry, and Academia/Other. The 
perspective of communities impacted by geothermal development is also included in this study, 
but not directly through this survey. I present the community perspective as a commentary on the 
policy recommendations and suggestions receive in the survey. In some cases, this community 
perspective may align with perspectives expressed by those in government, industry, and/or 
academia. However, in other instances, there may be important differences that might shade the 
results derived from the survey and alter final policy recommendations.  See Appendix table 7 
for organizational affiliation of study participants. 
A scale of 1 through 5 (1 being low, 5 being high) was used for each question in the 
interview to evaluate each individual’s personal perception25 of a given advantage, development 
barrier, or development incentive. After completing all interviews, I aggregated the results to 
discern the general perceptions of the collective group about the strength and/or importance of 
each of the advantages, barriers, or incentives.  
The interview also included a series of open questions. These questions allowed key 
actors to indicate important advantages, barriers, or incentives they felt may have been missing 
from the survey. Advantages, barriers, and incentives mentioned frequently by actors in the open 
                                                 
24 Bloomberg New Energy Finance. Q3 2012 Geothermal Market Outlook. Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2012. 
1 PDF File. 
25 Note: Interviews captured the opinions of the individuals interviewed and not necessarily the official position of 
the companies, organizations, or firms with which they are affiliated. 
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question section of the interview are also considered important in this study and several are 
included in our conclusion. 
I derived our conclusions about the relative strength or weakness of each respective 
advantage, barrier, or incentive in the following way: 
1. STRONG: Advantages, barriers, and incentives are considered strong if the average response 
of participants from three categories (Industry, Government, and Academia/Other) is 
between 4.0 and 5.0. Some advantages, barriers, and incentives may also be considered 
strong if respondents consistently mentioned them as being strong during the ‘open question’ 
section of the interview. 
2. MODERATE/WEAK: Advantages, Barriers, and Incentives are considered moderate or 
weak if the average response of all three categories (Industry, Government, and 
Academia/Other) is below 4.0. 
3. CHALLENGES: Advantages, Barriers, and Incentives are considered ‘challenges’ if one or 
two sector(s) finds the importance of the variable to be greater than 4.0 (strong) and one or 
two other sector(s) gives it an average value of less than 4.0 (moderate/weak). The lack of 
alignment among the categories of actors for a given issue may represent a challenge to 
developing more effective geothermal policy. 
 
Barriers and incentives that are perceived to be strong – that is when all actors are in general 
agreement – are assumed to be better candidates for policy solutions if political, economic, 
and/or social conditions are favorable for governing bodies to pass legislation. At the very least, 
it may give actors an idea of where to begin when considering which barriers or incentive 
mechanisms to pursue first. For example, if all actors in the survey were in agreement that ‘high 
21 
initial costs’ are a significant barrier, it would make sense that a policy solution for this barrier 
may be more achievable. Conversely, if actors are in general disagreement about a specific 
theme, as is the case with the legal framework in my survey, it may signal that policy solutions 
are less achievable in the near term. Disagreement on a specific theme does not inherently mean 
that a policy solution is less necessary for that theme – it simply means that the solution may be 
more difficult to achieve. The line of thought behind this process is represented in the Figure 5 
below: 
 
Figure 5: Line of Thought in Creating the Survey 
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7.0  RESULTS: ADVANTAGES 
7.1.1 Strong Advantages 
On average, participants across all categories found these advantages to be strong reasons for 
geothermal development in Chile. See Appendix Table 8 for data. 
• It is an abundant resource in Chile.  Although estimates for potential output are still 
unproven, all sectors were in agreement that resources are abundant in Chile. 
• It is a domestic source of energy and, therefore, improves energy security.  
• Geothermal energy has a very high capacity factor and, therefore, improves energy 
security. Plants producing electricity from geothermal sources produce a consistent and 
reliable source of power around the clock. In this manner, geothermal plants function 
much like their fossil fuel counterparts and serve as a near-perfect, clean substitute. 
Geothermal energy could power the large mining sector, which currently depends on 
expensive diesel and LNG plants or environmentally damaging and socially contentious 
coal plants. 
• Geothermal technology is mature and has been used in other parts of the world for 
more than 50 years.   
• It is versatile resource and can be employed for direct uses (i.e. greenhouses, heating, 
etc.) as well as electricity generation. The development of a robust geothermal sector in 
23 
Chile has implications beyond electricity generation. Home heating and greenhouses are 
among several other commercial applications of geothermal energy. For example, 87% of 
households in Iceland use geothermal resources for heating.26 
• It has a low environmental impact relative to other energy sources. While no energy 
source has zero impact on the environment, geothermal energy can be produced with 
lower impact relative to most other energy sources. 
• Geothermal plants can be built in a ‘modular’ fashion. Plant capacity can be 
gradually increased as demand increases. Investors and developers do not need to build 
a large plant in the first phase of exploitation. The plant size may gradually be increased 
as demand increases.  
• As an NCRE source of power, geothermal energy can be uses to diminish pollution 
levels and meet international environmental goals. As a new OECD member, Chile has 
added incentive to participate in international environmental agreements. Meeting 
international environmental goals may have future economic and political implications. 
• Some geothermal resources are located near mining operations and can be used by 
the mining industry. The mining industry currently uses about 37% of all electricity in 
Chile.27 Most of the energy consumed by the mining sector in the northern region of the 
country is derived from fossil fuels.28 
 
                                                 
26 Bjornsson, Sveinborjn. Geothermal Development and Research in Iceland.  Iceland National Energy Authority 
and Ministries of Industry and Commerce.  April 2006. 
27 Comisión Nacional de Energia (CNE) and Deutsche Gesellschft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), NCRE in 
the Electricity Market. 2009, 29. 
28 Government of Chile. Comisión Asesora Para El Desarollo Elétrico. Government of Chile, 2011. 27. PDF File. 
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7.1.2 Challenge Advantages 
On average, participants were in disagreement about these advantages of geothermal energy in 
Chile under current policy conditions. See Table 8 for data. 
• Geothermal projects support economic development for nearby communities. 
Globally, geothermal projects have had mixed success in supporting economic 
opportunities in nearby communities. Research on one geothermal project in Kenya 
found that many locals saw few direct economic benefits from the geothermal facilities.29 
However, this is not always the case. Development plans in New Zealand and the United 
States, for example, have found ways to address community needs and even make local 
community members stakeholders in the financial success of the plant.3031 I will discuss 
this theme in more detail in the ‘Community Barriers’ section of this paper. 
• Development of geothermal energy in Chile will create jobs and promote overall 
national economic growth. Many nations promote NCRE development under the logic 
that building and maintaining domestic NCRE projects – like geothermal plants – will 
create jobs and help to develop a future economy powered by a secure, stable, clean 
energy supply. In our survey, actors in industry were relatively skeptical about the jobs 
and economic growth geothermal development would create.  Those in Government and 
Academia/Other were slightly more optimistic about the positive economic implications 
of geothermal development. I might not be surprised to see these mixed results given that 
                                                 
29 Mariita, Nicholas. 2002. “The Impact of Large-Scale Renewable Energy Development on the Poor: 
Environmental and Socio-economic impact of a Geothermal Power Plant on a Poor Rural Community in Kenya.” 
Energy Policy. 30: 1119-1128. 
30 The Geothermal Energy Association. Geothermal Energy in 2010. The Geothermal Energy Association, 2010. p. 
10. PDF File. 
31 “Crónica: Geotermia en Chile, ¿Hay Humo Blanco en Chile?” 24 Horas. 29 Aug 2008. Web. 
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the size and scope of geothermal energy is still uncertain in Chile. Without more study 
and exploration of Chile’s resources, it is difficult to conceptualize the size of the 
economic impact. 
• Based on international experience, geothermal energy is cost competitive per 
installed KW. Some actors were hesitant to cite ‘cost competitiveness per installed 
kilowatt’ as an advantage to geothermal energy in Chile.  Interestingly, those in 
government were least likely to find cost competitiveness as an advantage of geothermal 
energy. Perhaps, this metric can help us better understand the government’s relatively 
weak institutional support of geothermal energy relative to some other sources. This 
result shouldn’t be entirely unexpected. Without a geothermal plant in production, costs 
for geothermal energy remain relatively vague in the Chilean context, despite analysis by 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance that suggests competitiveness based on international 
experience. Unlike in other countries with price supports and/or subsidies, there is more 
uncertainty around geothermal energy prices in the Chilean market.  I believe that more 
significant government support of geothermal projects and the introduction of some 
incentive schemes could make ‘cost competitiveness’ both an advantage and a stronger 
reason to invest in the sector. I will discuss this in more detail in the ‘Financial Barriers’ 
section of this paper. 
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8.0  RESULTS: BARRIERS, INCENTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 FINANCIAL BARRIERS 
Despite favorable LCOE for geothermal energy, proving a resource’s viability is both 
expensive and risky – especially, at this time, in Chile. Few investors are willing to assume this 
risk. Developers require some level of additional government assistance to facilitate project 
development.  
There are extremely high initial costs incurred during exploration period. Deep wells are 
drilled to determine if resource can produce an economically viable amount of energy. There is 
no guarantee that exploration will produce a viable resource. The United States Department of 
Energy reports the average success rate of exploration wells to be roughly 20% to 25%.32 Due to 
a set of particularly challenging conditions in Chile (i.e. a shortage of service providers and 
drilling equipment coupled with remote resources), the costs for geothermal exploration in Chile 
can be significantly higher than the world average.33 Geothermal plants use the same drilling rigs 
as used in natural gas and some other fossil fuel exploration. Considering Chile is not home to 
these fossil fuel resources, any rigs would need to be imported from Argentina or Peru to Chile 
for geothermal projects alone. The rigs arrive in 70 to 80 shipping containers. To further 
                                                 
32 United States Department of Energy. Geothermal Tomorrow. United States Department of Energy, 2008. p 20. 
PDF File. 
33 Espinosa, Carolina. Personal Interview. 26 July 2012. 
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complicate the situation, these geothermal developers need to compete with large, multi-national 
fossil fuel energy companies to contract usage of these rigs, often resulting in long delays until 
equipment is secured. Indeed, many of the respondents indicate that the lack of drilling and 
service providers was a key concern – indicating that some sort of policy solution is likely 
necessary (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey Question 21). 
According to the IEA, drilling accounts for roughly 20% to 35% of the capital 
expenditure on an average geothermal project outside of Chile.34 See Table 2 for average 
industry-wide project costs in $USD (2008) per MW of capacity, which was about $UDS 4 
million. In Chile, the costs are about $6 to $7 million per MW produced.35 Considering some 
geothermal projects in Chile may be producing at 50MW or even 100MW, it is easy to see how 
these high initial costs coupled with unusually high drilling expenses in Chile present some 
serious financial hurdles for developers.  
Table 2: Typical Geothermal Power Plant Development Costs (2008) 
Source: United States Department of Energy 
In addition to the NCRE quota, Chile currently offers a relatively small financial 
incentive for development of renewables. For NCRE projects in general, the 2005 Invest Chile 
Project introduced government subsidies during the pre-investment stages (feasibility studies) of 
NCRE projects through the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), these subsidies 
                                                 
34 Internatinal Energy Association. Renewable Energy Essentials: Geothermal. International Energy Association, 
2010. PDF File. 
35 Quote from ENEL GreenPower Chile. 
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are relatively small (maximum of $USD 60,000, with a limit of 50% of the study cost and 2% of 
the estimated investment) and do not assist with the potentially much more significant expenses 
incurred during the drilling phase of the project.36 Despite this incentive, many of the key actors 
surveyed, on average, perceived the financial risks of geothermal development to remain quite 
high (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey Question 13).  Because most of actors interviewed (across 
all sectors) agreed on the importance of this barrier, I can discern that it is likely that both those 
who have the power to offer the incentives (the government) and those who would like the 
incentives (the developers) both view financing as an obstacle. Thus, the debate around financing 
lies not in the strength of the barrier but in how and what can be done to resolve this issue.  
Without sufficient incentives, the aforementioned costs of exploration remain too high to 
spur significant levels of growth in the private market. While the existing incentives for 
feasibility studies may seem somewhat generous, it is important to consider that Chile has not 
implemented some of the key financial mechanisms that have been used in an attempt to drive 
geothermal development across the world in recent years – specifically tax credits and price 
tariffs – nor has it sought to investigate more creative financing schemes that may help to reduce 
risk in a geothermal market that is extremely promising. 
8.1.1 Tax Credits 
Recent geothermal development in the United States has largely been the result of Production 
Tax Credit (PTC) of 2.2 cents/kWh (2010 $USD).37 The PTC was introduced as part the 2009 
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stimulus package and received support of some prominent politicians.38 It is not simply the tax 
incentive alone, but sustained political support of the incentive that has made it a valuable tool 
for the industry in the past few years – and potentially into the future. Similar tax incentives have 
been used to expand development of wind energy in the U.S. as well.39 Chile might consider 
implementing such a tax incentive to encourage more investment by allowing for a more 
expedient and, potentially, larger return on said investment. On average, those in industry and 
those in academia felt tax credits would be a strong incentive in Chile. Notably, those in 
government, on average, did not feel the tax incentive would be as beneficial (See Appendix 
Figure 9, Survey Question 15). 
8.1.2 Price Tariffs 
Many other nations attempting to spur geothermal development have found it necessary to 
implement feed-in tariffs (price guarantees) for geothermal energy. Price tariffs for geothermal 
energy have recently been implemented in Japan (USD $330/MWh to USD $500/MWh) and 
Indonesia (USD $110 MW/h to USD $170/MWh), among many others.40 Tariffs have been 
received with mixed success around the world. In Chile, a proposed NCRE law that calls for 
20% of energy to be generated from NCRE sources by 2020 includes such a price tariff. The 
proposed law features a 12-year tariff that would be set via a tendering system.41 Passage of the 
law – and subsequently the implementation of the tariff – would likely help to encourage more 
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development. A price guarantee would ensure that projects could promise a more specific 
estimate of return on investment, thus reducing uncertainty for investors. Moreover, a price 
guarantee would ensure that price fluctuations in other energy sources (i.e. fossil fuels) would 
not jeopardize an existing or proposed project’s viability. As shale gas imports from the United 
States look increasingly likely within the next few years, it is important to ensure geothermal 
development in Chile will not become unhinged by an influx of new fossil fuel energy.42 On 
average, those in industry and those in academia felt feed-in tariffs would be a strong incentive 
in Chile. Again, notably, those in government, on average, did not feel the tariff would be as 
beneficial (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey Question 16). 
8.1.3 Incentives for Off-takers 
Another solution may be incentives for the off-takers (i.e. those who purchase the energy). These 
incentives would largely come in the form of tax incentives provided by the government. That is, 
large companies – perhaps those in the mining sector – that sign energy contracts with 
geothermal companies may be able to receive additional benefits in the form of tax relief for 
making this purchase. In doing so, the companies would have greater incentive to sign power 
purchase agreements (PPA’s) with geothermal developers before projects come online. Thus, it 
would be easier for geothermal developers to attract investment because it would be certain that 
there was a buyer for the energy as soon as the plant reached the point of production. This type 
of incentive might be politically challenging, considering most of the off-takers that would be 
able to benefit from such tax relief would be consumers that would contract directly with 
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generation companies for their energy. These consumers are very heavy users of energy (i.e. big 
industry). The public may be wary of the government providing additional tax relief to large 
businesses and not the average electricity consumer, who must purchase his or her energy 
through a distributor. On average, those in industry and those in academia felt tax incentives for 
off-takers would be a moderately strong incentive in Chile. Again, notably, those in government, 
on average, did not feel the off-taker tax incentive would be quite as beneficial (See Appendix 
Figure 9, Survey Question 17).  
8.1.4 Recommendation 
A most interesting finding in in our review of financial incentives was the fact that most actors in 
government perceived the barrier of financing and risk to be strong but were often hesitant to 
support incentives to diminish the barrier. That is, there is a tacit acknowledgement of a barrier 
but a general reluctance to consider a solution. That said, there is little doubt the government will 
need to change its tune to a certain degree to help spur greater development in the sector. Based 
on the survey results, I recommend the introduction of tax incentives for both producers and off-
takers. In this sense, the government can both push supply and pull demand for geothermal 
energy. Feed-in Tariffs might also be considered to reinforce these tax incentives, as it would 
ensure that projects at the point of generation remain profitable in the near term if energy prices 
were to shift downward. Given Chile’s unique political and economic environment, government 
leaders may need to consider a variety of proven and unproven incentives. While the exact mix 
of financial incentives may take some time to determine, the need for the government to 
introduce a much more robust set of financial enticements is evident. The introduction of greater 
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financial incentives represents a clear opportunity for the government to reevaluate its strategy 
and create the space for more opportunity in geothermal energy. 
 
8.2 MARKET ENTRY BARRIERS 
Some geothermal projects are located in remote areas, making access and exploitation 
difficult. 
Because many of the geothermal resources in Chile are located in remote areas far from 
population centers, grid connection can be both difficult and expensive. To ease complications 
with transmission and grid connection of NCRE projects, the government offers a 50% subsidy 
(up to $300,000/year) to reduce costs associated with connecting projects to the grid. Our survey 
indicates that the current incentives can still be insufficient for geothermal projects and finds that 
government assistance in both transmission connection and infrastructure development near 
geothermal sites would be immensely beneficial (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey Question 19). 
Without easy access to the market, remote geothermal sites – no matter how large the 
resource may be – will be more costly, as connecting to the grid and getting equipment and labor 
to the area will be more difficult. With initial investment costs already high, costs associated 
with remote exploration/exploitation only increase the financial risk companies must bear.43 
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8.2.1 Recommendation 
The government is currently considering a ‘Carretera Electrica (Electric Highway)’ transmission 
project that aims to facilitate new transmission infrastructure connected to the main grids.44 In 
order to promote production from all viable geothermal resources, the government could 
carefully consider areas of potential geothermal exploration and exploitation while envisioning 
the ‘Carretera Electrica (Electric Highway)’. In addition, the government could actively ensure 
that the necessary infrastructure needed for remote exploration and exploitation is in place.  By 
ensuring that remote sources can be effectively exploited, the government will likely reduce 
some of the risk associated with geothermal projects. 
8.3 LEGAL/REGULATORY BARRIERS:  
Development companies need to navigate complicated local, provincial, and federal 
regulations. Additionally, developers often enter costly and lengthy negotiations with 
landowners for access to the site. 
Chile is not unique in the fact that geothermal development companies face a myriad of 
regional regulations and incentives and, at times, problematic negotiations with landowners near 
project sites. Similar ordeals play out for developers in many countries – including the United 
States – where federal regulations and incentives coexist with additional, distinct state policies.45 
However, years of geothermal energy production in the United States have made certain states 
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friendlier environments for development – particularly those in the Western half of the country.46 
Developers in Chile do not benefit from the same history of development and/or the same 
general understanding of the resource by federal, regional, and/or local officials. In Chile, 
individuals in industry and academia, on average, found the current legal and regulatory 
framework in Chile to be insufficient and felt the government could improve current legal and 
regulatory frameworks on both federal and regional levels (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey 
Question 28). Actors in government generally felt the legal framework was sufficient, suggesting 
that this is clear disagreement about the efficacy of the existing framework. Policy changes in 
this area may be particularly difficult to achieve. 
A primary concern among development companies is site access. While a geothermal 
concession confers temporary rights to explore and/or exploit the geothermal resources on a 
given piece of land, the concession law, as it stands, is generally ineffective in helping 
companies navigate difficult issues related to the ownership (or perceived ownership) of other 
resources within the boundaries of the concession. After approval of the concession, companies 
sometimes deal with legal issues related to access to the site, access to water (a crucial element to 
geothermal energy production47), transmission lines, and indigenous claims to the territory. 
There is no guarantee that if exploration yields a viable resource there will be a clear or, at least 
navigable, path to exploitation. I do not mean to say that every geothermal reserve warrants 
immediate access for exploration or exploitation. Indeed, some sites are environmentally, 
economically, and/or culturally sensitive areas. Careful consideration of the unique qualities of 
the site is necessary before any development. That said, the geothermal concessions do not 
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clearly or sufficiently address the broader resource needs of the geothermal company at the start 
of the project. Equally as important, the concession law does not address the needs of local 
communities near the project site. The potential legal costs and time delays associated with these 
issues add to the already high exploration costs and can severely damage public sentiment about 
geothermal energy development. 
8.3.1 Recommendation 
Because those in industry and government provided additional comments about the legal 
framework that went beyond the themes of our survey question, I provide a recommendation that 
is mostly derived from open discussion with key actors about these themes (See Appendix Figure 
10 for Open Question Results). These discussions revealed and clarified other legal obstacles. As 
such, I recommend that the government review the current geothermal law to examine and 
reevaluate the following items:  
8.3.2 Flexibility of the Concession: 
Currently, concessions have a period of two years with an option of renewal for an additional 
two years. This two-year period may be insufficient for some concessions in extreme climates, 
which cannot be explored/exploited year round. It may also be insufficient if local community 
concerns require a negotiation or mediation process. Finally, a 2-year period may be insufficient 
for concessions located in areas that require more lengthy environmental impact studies due to 
characteristics of the surrounding ecosystem and/or geological context. I do not recommend that 
a ‘blanket extension’ be added to the period of all concessions. I simply stress that some 
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concessions may warrant longer windows of time for exploration than others. This will require 
both a change to the existing law and a more careful review by the Ministry of Energy prior to 
granting the concession. 
The size of the concession is also very inflexible. The law requires that concessions have 
the shape of a parallelogram, meaning that all sides must be perfectly straight lines.48 Some 
concessions, particularly those near international borders, may require a unique shapes so they 
can fully and effectively exploit resources. 
8.3.3 Environmental Impacts Studies:  
Environmental impact studies and evaluations are the responsibility of local authorities, which is 
consistent with the way they are handled in many other countries with geothermal programs. 
However, many of the participants from industry noted that the studies for geothermal projects 
often do not follow the same standards from region to region. Therefore, study procedures and 
results may vary significantly. This lack of uniformity is further complicated by the fact that 
some of the regional government representatives who evaluate the projects are not experts in 
geothermal development. The impact studies need to be tailored to geothermal development 
based on the distinct qualities of geothermal projects and any regional environmental concerns 
that may be unique to geothermal development. I recommend that the government reevaluate 
both the standards of these evaluations and the personnel who are responsible for doing these 
evaluations. To clarify, I do not suggest that all regions adopt the same criteria environmental 
impact studies. Clearly, different regions, different climates, and different geological conditions 
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will warrant different environmental considerations. However, a federal overview of regional 
regulations may provide useful insight into how these impact studies may be made more 
effective and efficient. Furthermore, the government may be able to remove some of the 
potentially unnecessary inconsistencies that developers experience across states. A more uniform 
study with better-informed evaluators will be necessary to facilitate greater levels of future 
geothermal development and will remove some uncertainty and costs for developers. At present, 
developers sometimes face serious time delays during the environmental impact study period. 
These delays, in turn, require a company to stretch its credit – as the future plant is now even 
farther from production. 
New Zealand provides an example of how Chile might add clarity and consistency to this 
process. In New Zealand, each development field has a unique review panel composed of 3 
independent geothermal experts. These experts are often retired geothermal professionals and/or 
university faculty. The panel meets on several occasions each year to review impact studies to 
provide recommendations for necessary changes to the current assessments.49  
Additionally, current regulations stipulate that an environmental impact study is 
conducted only when a project enters the period of exploitation. This means that developers are 
only legally obligated to consult with local communities after exploration occurs. Damage to the 
surrounding environment can occur in exploration just as it might occur in exploitation. 
Communities near projects are generally unaware of any impact these exploration activities 
might have and suspicions are sometimes raised. As such, I suggest that environmental impact 
studies might also be considered at the beginning of the exploratory phase. It may be very useful 
to understand the potential nature of any environmental hurdles a project may face before 
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millions are spent during the process of exploration. Early impact studies are practiced in some 
countries with established geothermal sectors, like Nicaragua and Iceland.50  Relying on impact 
studies only late in the project’s lifecycle can lead to significant delays due to unanticipated 
findings. Obviously, the true magnitude of the project’s impact will likely not be known until 
drilling begins. However, there is some added value to assessing the current state of the 
environment and any gaining an understanding of the more easily discerned environmental 
concerns for long-term development. At the very least, these early impact studies would provide 
baseline environmental conditions for the site. Thus, when a plant reaches production, any 
environmental problems that may arise can be attributed (or not attributed) to the geothermal 
facility. Perhaps more importantly, communities may be less wary of nearby geothermal 
endeavors if, to some degree, they better understand the potential environmental impact and are 
consulted prior to beginning any exploration activities. I realize that earlier impact studies will be 
an added expense for developers. Therefore, I suggest that the government include the costs of 
these studies in our proposed resource assessment and ranking initiative. Because the 
government might cover the costs of these assessments, the information should be public record, 
allowing communities to understand current conditions. 
8.3.4 Investment vs. Development: The Role of the ‘Speculator’: 
Many of those interviewed in industry noted that concessions were often simply granted to the 
individual or firm that promised the most investment. Many of those in industry felt that the 
evaluation of a given applicant’s technical ability to develop a geothermal project was not being 
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conducted effectively. While the law currently stipulates that a technical evaluation should take 
place51, many developers did not feel that the current evaluation was sufficient. Without the use 
of such a mechanism, many speculators have entered the bidding processes. These speculators 
often do not have the capability to develop projects themselves and simply make it more 
expensive for some legitimate developers to receive concessions. I recommend that government 
institutions more strongly incorporate a technical and professional evaluation component for the 
geothermal concession process. It may be necessary to reevaluate the law and describe in greater 
detail the technical requirements or experience developers must possess to receive a concession. 
8.3.5 Incorporation of the Spirit of ILO Convention 169 into Geothermal Law 
19.657 
On September 15, 2008, the government of Chile ratified the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) Convention No. 169, The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989. The purpose 
of this ILO convention is to recognize the aspirations of indigenous peoples to “exercise control 
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop 
their identities, languages, and religions, within the framework of the States in which they 
live…”52 By signing this convention, Chile signaled to the world it planned to ensure indigenous 
communities would be carefully considered in the institutional and legal framework of the 
country.  Yet the government has still not incorporated the spirit of this international agreement 
into many domestic laws and regulations.   
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This lack of clarity about indigenous issues and rights in Chile’s legal and institutional 
framework has led to an increased level of uncertainty in all energy development projects, 
including those in the geothermal sector (See Appendix Table X, Survey Question 42).  Some 
geothermal companies have landed in a quagmire of disputes and debates with community 
leaders. These debates can lead to costly delays in project development and damaged 
relationships with local inhabitants. In a 2008 report53, the U.S. Department of Energy noted, 
“The cost of time delays is significant, sometimes adding $10 to $20 or more per MWh to the 
cost of power.” Our data suggests that uncertainty about indigenous rights within geothermal 
concessions causes trepidation among some actors in the sector. This feeling of unease is well 
founded. In 2008, Geotérmica del Norte, received approval from the regional government to 
begin exploiting a geothermal resource knows as El Tatio. Despite initial resistance by the 
indigenous community, the company moved ahead with its plan to drill four deep wells.  The 
company had met all necessary government requirements.54 However, exploitation of the site 
was no easy task. After a well failure, the local community became even more vocal in their 
opposition. The government eventually relented to those opposed to the project.55  Four years 
later, the El Tatio project remains in ‘standby status’ and is still wrapped in controversy.56  
There is indeed a significant lack of consideration for the indigenous community in the 
concession-granting process. Concessions are being granted in areas that are important to 
indigenous groups – particularly areas the government designates as ‘natural reserves’. While 
Chile has signed Convention No. 169, it has not considered this agreement in the geothermal 
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concession law or any other institutional framework related to geothermal projects. Article 15 of 
the convention states: 
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface 
resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall 
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, 
with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be 
prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or 
exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned shall 
wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair 
compensation for any damage which they may sustain as a result of such activities. 
 
While the rights to these subsurface resources in Chile are in private hands, the 
government does regulate the manner in which these resources are distributed. In accordance 
with Convention No. 169, I strongly recommend that the government consider a change to 
domestic policy that supports the goals and ideals of this international agreement. The lack of 
clarity in regard to indigenous rights within geothermal concessions leads to a sense of 
uncertainty among some actors in the sector. The government should better understand the 
claims of indigenous communities in these territories and should then consider these claims 
when granting concessions. First and foremost, many communities - particularly those in the arid 
northern regions of the country – are concerned about ground water. Geothermal plants often 
require significant amounts of water to be pumped from deep reservoirs generate the necessary 
steam from hot underground reservoirs to turn turbines and generate electricity. Some 
communities in northern Chile view geothermal development as a threat to their already scarce 
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water resources.57 The current law does not contain any provisions that would ensure these 
communities retain their water supply. As such, local communities in dry regions may be 
particularly wary of geothermal development. One of Chile’s first geothermal projects – in El 
Tatio – was halted due to community opposition.58 The company did not execute the wells 
properly and a blow-out occurred on the site. As a result, a tower of steam and hot water shot 
into the air for weeks and nearby geysers lost their water supply. A culturally sensitive site was 
forever changed. While it is commonly believed within the geothermal sector that the El Tatio 
site was mismanaged and was not developed using best practices within the industry, those 
outside of the geothermal sector view El Tatio as an example of how geothermal developers can 
entirely mismanage water resources and destroy sensitive natural sites. 
 To better comprehend the nature of these claims, the government could be more 
proactive in consulting indigenous groups prior to granting concessions. This consultation could 
be part of the pre-exploration environmental impact study I suggested earlier. Following this 
logic, the government may also be wise to better define areas that would be risky and/or off 
limits for exploration and exploitation. Some leaders in the renewable sector have suggested that 
royalty payments may make communities more willing to cooperate. Certainly, additional 
income would be useful to any community. These payments, however, may simply be viewed as 
a way of ‘buying off’ those who might oppose the project. And while there may be some value to 
these payments, they would not replace lost water supply for communities. When the well is dry, 
the well is dry. People would need to relocate to survive. Indigenous peoples would be forced to 
part with a land that is central to their culture. As such, it is likely that particularly dry areas with 
                                                 
57 Cruz Plaza, Antonio. Energía Geotermica y los Pueblos Atacameños. Offices of the Center for Geothermal 
Excellence of the Andes at La Universidad de Chile. Santiago, Chile. 4 Apr. 2013. Guest Speaker. 
58 Espinosa, Carolina. Personal Interview. 26 July 2012. 
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inhabitants should be ‘off limits’ to geothermal exploration. At present, geothermal projects are 
forbidden only in national parks.  Reserves and other areas of special designation remain open to 
geothermal development. However, not all areas currently open to development are smart places 
for development. While it is currently legal to drill in a site like El Tatio, it may also be 
extremely risky for geothermal companies and traumatic for local communities. The government 
might reduce some uncertainty and risk that is perceived in the market by mandating greater 
consideration of indigenous and local community claims and rights in the framework of 
geothermal concessions and regulation. 
 
8.4 INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS:  
There is a general lack of direction within the government in regard to geothermal resources. 
Some government institutions out of sync on geothermal issues. There are few geothermal 
professionals working in government and they are widely scattered. 
A lack of direction in existing policy and a lack of general institutional support for 
geothermal energy sometimes lead to suboptimal regulation. While the government has 
mandated that NCRE sources comprise 10% of all new energy contracts by 202459, it has not put 
forth no concrete plan for developing these resources. There exists no clear policy for the 
development of geothermal in Chile, as sufficient tools to spur development remain undefined in 
the country’s plan for the future of energy in Chile.60 Investors may be wary of supporting 
                                                 
59 International Energy Agency. Chile Energy Policy Review. International Energy Agency, 2009. 167. PDF File. 
60 Espinosa, Carolina. Personal Interview. 26 July 2012. 
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projects without understanding the government’s level of support for geothermal energy. To be 
clear, no country – with perhaps the exception of early development in the United States in the 
1970’s – has developed a robust geothermal energy sector without very clear and effective policy 
and actions aimed at advancing and sustaining projects.61 Our data suggests that those in 
industry and academia, on average, find this to be a strong barrier for development. Those in 
government do not feel as strongly (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey Questions 32 and 33). 
Again, we find disagreement among some of our key actors and see an area where a solution 
may be less imminent. However, it is important to consider that Chile will be holding 
presidential elections in 2014. A new administration may give rise to a changed perspective 
among government actors, potentially making a solution more likely. 
Perhaps the most important symptom of the lack of a clear energy policy is manifested in 
the manner in which geothermal energy regulation is handled by government institutions. While 
the Ministry of Energy is technically the ‘figurehead’ department for all energy resources, 
responsibility for geothermal energy projects, information, and evaluation remains scattered 
across several government institutions including, but not limited to, The Ministry of Energy, the 
Center for Renewable Energy, and SERNAGEOMIN (The National Service of Geology and 
Mining). Moreover, these institutions also have very few people dedicated specifically to 
managing and advancing geothermal development.  The Ministry of Energy, for example, has 
just one person focused full-time on geothermal energy.  Conversely, in 2009, New Zealand had 
a much larger government support staff for the geothermal sector. The country employed 30 
individuals engaged in geological services, 9 individuals in federal government offices, and 6 
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individuals in regional offices.62 Without a sufficient number of ‘subject matter experts’ under 
the roof of a single government entity, the Chilean institutions in place to manage geothermal 
energy are sometimes not able to do so effectively or efficiently. 
8.4.1 Recommendation 
Because responses to this incentive were, on average, uniformly strong, I believe it is essential 
for the government to deliver a plan for development of geothermal energy. However, I also 
recognize that the government cannot effectively write policy for geothermal development 
without having a somewhat accurate understanding of the nation’s geothermal energy potential. 
In this aspect, the need for a government-sponsored resource assessment is crucial. The 
government has completed similar preliminary studies for hydropower resources. Furthermore, 
the government will need to better clarify plans for energy development as a whole and the role 
of NCRE within that development.  Creating geothermal energy policy without attempting to 
understand the balance of the energy mix in Chile makes little sense.  The future of geothermal 
energy development cannot be addressed in a vacuum, as the other energy resources with which 
it competes in the market define its competitiveness. 
                                                 
62 New Zealand Geothermal Association. Skills Issues in the Geothermal Sector. New Zealand Geothermal 
Association, 2009. 29.  PDF File. 
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8.5 EDUCATION AND WORKFORCE BARRIERS:  
Many Chilean universities do not support programs specifically designed to develop 
geothermal professionals. Additionally, few universities actively support geothermal energy 
research initiatives (See Appendix Figure 9, Survey Questions 38 and 45). 
In part, the lack of service providers in Chile can be explained by the lack of geothermal 
professionals being produced by Chileans higher education system. While much progress has 
been made in recent years with the development of the Centro de Excelencia en Geotermia de 
Los Andes (CEGA) at the Universidad de Chile, the academic study of geothermal resources in 
Chile has still not reached a level of maturity. The academic community often lacks the resources 
to gather important data and information related to geothermal exploration in Chile. Currently, 
much of the information collected about Chile’s resources lies in the hands of the private firms 
who fund the exploration. The government does collect some data in a relatively informal 
manner through the concession granting process, but does not have any formal requirement about 
the disclosure of all data.63 Research at the university level is, at this point, somewhat limited by 
a lack of available information.  
Because geothermal fields in Chile exist in a unique geological context, professionals 
who arrive from other regions may not truly be ‘experts’ on geothermal exploration and 
exploitation in Chile. A lack of mature academic resources could manifest itself in a slower 
growth within the sector, as the market sometimes relies on foreign actors to advance projects. 
Additionally, a lack of geothermal professionals on the domestic level will likely serve to 
dampen Chile’s political responses to geothermal opportunities because fewer domestic voices 
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within the political system will be calling for greater institutional and legal support of the sector. 
Perhaps most importantly, a more mature academic nucleus of geothermal study in Chile would 
produce greater amounts of information, greater numbers of knowledgeable professionals, and 
new technologies that would assist in reducing risks and, subsequently, the costs associated with 
geothermal exploration in the Andean context.  
 
8.5.1 Recommendation 
The sentiment within many in industry was that the research centers would develop as a response 
to business demands. Thus, a stronger market for geothermal energy would lead to a greater need 
for professionals and, subsequently, greater public and private support for research centers like 
CEGA. In the interim period, however, research centers face many challenges advancing studies 
and projects.  CEGA, the geothermal research center at the Universidad de Chile, has been in 
existence for less than two years. Therefore, much of the work being done through the center has 
yet to have significant impact on the geothermal sector in Chile. Furthermore, the state has only 
made funding for the center available for a possible total of 10 years.64 Other than providing 
funding, the government generally has little interaction with the center. Limited funding and 
limited institutional interaction with this center places a constraint on the center’s ability to 
function as a true incubator for innovation and information. I recommend that the government 
secure long-term funding for the center and to develop a mechanism to facilitate the sharing of 
information between government institutions and the universities. This relationship would be 
                                                 
64 Morata, Diego. Personal Interview. 14 Aug. 2012. 
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especially beneficial should the government engage in its own large study of geothermal 
resource potential in Chile. 
To do their part, the universities can continue to sponsor relevant informational seminars 
and forums with both regional and international participants. In this way, the universities may 
continue to broaden the conversation around geothermal development in Chile and increase 
awareness about global geothermal initiatives and best practices.  
 
8.6  SOCIAL BARRIERS:  
Some groups may oppose projects near environmentally or culturally sensitive sites. 
In the legal barriers section of this paper we discussed issues related to rights of 
communities near projects. Aside from these issues, there is also a general misunderstanding of 
the resource, which may complicate relationships between development companies and nearby 
communities. Many of the individuals surveyed indicated that the public is generally unaware of 
what exactly geothermal energy entails. The U.S. Department of Energy regards ‘outreach and 
education’ as a key component to government support of the geothermal sector.65 A 2011 
survey66 of nearly 700 Chileans asked them to choose their preferred energy source(s), allowing 
for the selection of more than one source. 20% of respondents preferred geothermal as an energy 
source. In comparison, 61% of respondents selected solar energy, 57% preferred wind, and 39% 
                                                 
65 The National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Policymakers’ Guidebook for Geothermal Energy Generation. The 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy. 2011. 5. PDF File. 
66 Aravena, Claudia, W. George Hutchinson, and Alberto Longo. 2012. “Environmental Pricing of Externalities 
from Different Sources of Electricity Generation in Chile.” Energy Economics. 34: 1220. 
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preferred hydropower. All fossil fuel sources were preferred by less than 20% of respondents, 
with gas leading conventional sources at 12%. The fact that geothermal lags so far behind its 
NCRE counterparts (and so close to its fossil fuel counterparts) suggests that the public may be 
generally unaware of the benefits of geothermal power. See Appendix Figure 11 for full survey 
results. 
 
8.6.1 Recommendation 
The government may consider public awareness campaigns that highlight the economic, social, 
and environmental impacts of geothermal development. These programs may be specifically 
targeted to school-aged children so that future generations have a clearer understanding of the 
nature of the country’s energy options. Ultimately, the success of geothermal power in Chile will 
likely be closely tied to gaining the support of the public, as exploration and exploitation may, at 
times, occur near communities and other sensitive sites. 
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9.0  CONCLUSION 
Through this study, I have used data and responses collected during a series of interviews to gain 
a better understanding of the characteristics, challenges, and opportunities of geothermal energy 
in the Chilean context. The final set of recommendations is summarized in the table at the end of 
the document. All actors in the geothermal sector will need to carefully consider barriers and 
policy changes related to: (1) high initial costs, (2) resource access, (3) a comprehensive legal 
framework, (4) institutional constraints, (5) social sustainability, (6) information dissemination, 
and (7) education and training. Agreement among survey respondents was not uniform across 
these themes. I find that policy solutions are likely to be most achievable for barriers related to 
financing, institutional constraints, and public awareness. The balance of the barriers – 
particularly those of the legal variety – may require solutions that are less feasible in the near 
term. See Figure 9 for final recommendations and feasibility assessments. 
In future analysis of geothermal policy in Chile, it may be necessary to include the 
perspective of ‘off-takers – those who buy energy from generation companies – in a market 
study. Gaining a clear understanding of what might entice them to buy geothermal energy is 
likely to be a crucial element as geothermal plants come online. While I do make mention of tax 
incentives for off-takers, there may be other (i.e. non-financial) tools that could entice them to 
buy from geothermal plants. Additionally, as Chile begins to develop its sector, there might be 
some value, at that point, in conducting case comparisons between Chile and countries that have 
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developed the resource with much greater state involvement. As geothermal gains traction 
around the world, there may be some valuable findings to glean from the Chilean experience. 
The Chilean government and other actors in the energy sector will need to determine the 
value of clean, secure, domestic energy. In a global economy with fluctuating fossil fuel costs, 
the value of geothermal development is likely to rise.  Figure 6 below indicates the International 
Energy Agency’s vision for the growth of geothermal energy around the world. The question 
today is: will Chile be a part of this projected growth in geothermal energy? 
Figure 6: International Energy Agency Roadmap Vision for Geothermal Power Production (TWh/y) 
 
Source: IEA Geothermal Roadmap, 2011 
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Figure 7: Recommendations and Policy Feasibility 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 1 
Current Energy Sources, 2011 
 
 
Source: Government of Chile. National Energy Strategy 2012-2030. Government of Chile, 2012. 
PDF File. 
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Figure 2 
Trends in Energy Consumption per Capita, 2010 
 
Source:  Martinez, Pablo. “GDF Suez in Chile.” Austral Offices. Santiago, Chile. 11 Mar. 2013. 
Invited Speaker. 
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Figure 3 
Review of Energy Resources Alternatives in Chile, 2013 
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Figure 4 
Key Geothermal Companies in the Chilean Market, 2013 
 
Source: Government of Chile, Ministry of Energy, and Official Company Websites 
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Figure 5 
 Key Energy Companies in the Chilean Market, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Official Company Websites 
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Figure 6 
Barriers to Geothermal Development, Based on International Experience, 2012 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance. Q3 2012 Geothermal Market Outlook. Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance, 2012. PDF File. 
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Figure 7 
Professional Affiliations of Persons Included in Study 
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Figure 8 
Survey Results – Advantages of Geothermal Development in Chile 
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Figure 9 
Survey Results – Barriers and Incentives for Geothermal Development in Chile 
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Figure 9 (Continued) 
Survey Results – Barriers and Incentives for Geothermal Development in Chile 
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Figure 10 
Survey Results – Open Questions 
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Figure 11 
Preferred Sources of Electricity Among Sample of Chilean Citizens 
 
Source: Aravena, Claudia, W. George Hutchinson, Alberto Longo. 2011. “Environmental 
Pricing of Externalities from Different Sources of Electricity Generation in Chile.” 
Energy Policy. 34: 1220.  
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